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The limitations of the traditional historiography of the ethical regulation of 
biomedical research are becoming increasingly well recognized. A simplistic 
history has been used to justify a simplistic policy, in the elaboration of regu-
latory instruments associated with a bureaucracy of administration and en-
forcement that has acquired its own material interests in self-perpetuation and 
jurisdictional expansion. The official history of institutionalized ethical regu-
lation sees a clear and self-evident line of descent from the Nazi experiments 
of World War II to the various legal and quasi-legal instruments that now 
govern most scientific and, increasingly, social scientific practice. Without 
regulatory interventions, it is claimed, researchers will revert to barbarism. 
This version of the "rise of bioethics" tends to place considerable empha-
sis on the Nuremberg Doctors Trial, and the Nuremberg Code promulgated 
at its conclusion, and to use these as an "origin myth" that legitimizes its pro-
fessional project.1 As a narrative, it says little, for example, about the lengthy 
gap between the conclusion of the Nuremberg trial in 1948 and the develop-
ment of regulatory interventions for medical research in the victor countries 
during the 1960s. It tends not to acknowledge the evidence, from writers like 
Henry Beecher in the United States and Maurice Pappworth in the United 
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Kingdom, that ethically questionable experiments continued in the victor 
countries well after World War II, a phenomenon explored further by Tal 
Bolton in a recent Ph.D. thesis and her article in this journal issue.2 However, 
it also tends to equate an absence of regulation with an absence of ethical 
concern, despite the evidence from Susan Lederer and Sydney Halpern about 
the effective operation of informal social controls in the United States before 
World War II.3 Most crucially, it neglects Jenny Hazelgroves exploration of 
the difficulty that the prosecutors faced in framing charges against the 
Nuremberg defendants because they were unable to point to any clear set of 
regulations or standards in any country other than Germany that could be 
said to have been violated.4 
The publication of further analyses of the pre-World War II German ex-
perience provides an additional resource for the critical examination of the 
claims being made about the importance of formal regulation in the mainte-
nance of ethical standards in biomedical research. This body of work has 
documented the rise of attempts at ethical research governance in Germany 
from the late nineteenth century through to the 1930s. In so doing, it may 
seem to provide us with an opportunity to explore the limits of regulation. 
Why did it fail to protect the victims of the Nazi medical experiments? Why 
did it seemingly attract so little international interest, despite Germany's 
leading role in science and biomedicine over much of this period?5 However, 
as a number of influential historians of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Germany have observed, the study of this period has suffered from 
the imposition of narrative arcs, influenced by sociology or political science, 
that see it only as the precursor to the disaster of the Nazi regime.6 No actor 
at the time consciously sought this end for their actions: even the Nazi lead-
ership sought power rather than defeat. Accounts that find a logic in the 
events from the late nineteenth century to the end of World War II may over-
look the unintended consequences of actors dealing with contingent events 
on the basis of partial information interpreted according to what were con-
temporaneously considered valid knowledge or theories. It is important, 
then, to avoid constructing an equally simplistic counter-narrative about the 
general ineffectiveness of regulation. 
CREATING CONCERN: THE EMERGENCE OF MEDICAL 
EXPERIMENTATION AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM 
If the search for a Grand Narrative of German history may be compared to 
the search for grand explanations in sociology or political science, the emphasis 
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on contingency resonates much more with some microsociological ap-
proaches that treat social order as a more local and spontaneous phenomenon. 
Within this framework, for example, social problems are not seen to be 
self-evident: they reflect processes by which problem entrepreneurs define 
some state of affairs as contrary to an interest or value that is critical to those 
groups in society with the power to legislate or otherwise intervene to alter 
that situation. They must be recognized, formulated, and defined in order to 
become a basis for action.7 Our first question, then, must be to ask how and 
when biomedical experimentation came to be seen as a social problem that 
required a regulatory solution. 
One genealogy of biomedical ethics emphasizes its descent from Thomas 
Percivals Medical Ethics, published in 1803. This tradition, however, is largely 
concerned with matters of professional etiquette, a doctors duties toward his 
peers and the profession as a whole.8 Percivals work precedes the rapid 
growth of human experimentation in the nineteenth century, and his com-
ments on duties to patients mostly focus on careful, and sober, observation 
and record-keeping. Sustained debates about the ethics of human experimen-
tation only began in Europe in the 1850s and a little later in the United States. 
Alex Dracoby describes a major dispute within the French medical profes-
sion in 1859 about experiments involving the deliberate infection of hospital 
patients with syphilis.9 Although two well-connected Paris physicians escaped 
prosecution, two others in Lyon were convicted of criminal assault and fined. 
However, this remained essentially a dispute within elite circles and there is 
no report of any coverage in the popular press. 
Dracoby suggests that the dearth of such cases in France implies the 
strength of informal social controls, although conceding that these were a 
weak constraint on a doctor who was really determined to carry out inappro-
priate experiments on his patients. The German and British medical profes-
sions were also discussing the ethics of human experimentation among 
themselves from the 1850s and these issues were picked up by U.S. doctors 
who had studied in Europe and returned in the 1870s.10 American physicians 
"who pursued postgraduate medical study in the hospitals and clinics of 
Vienna, Berlin and other European countries ... recalled their distaste for the 
attitudes displayed by German physicians toward their patients. ... 'Though 
the results were fairly satisfactory, the human element was largely lacking. 
The patient was something to work on, interesting experimental material, but 
little more.'"11 
Although German doctors appeared callous to some of their contempo-
raries, German legal academics were debating the basis of consent to treatment, 
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particularly of an experimental nature, by the 1880s.12 In 1890, there was 
widespread press criticism of an experiment by the Berlin surgeon Eugen 
Hahn on a woman with advanced breast cancer, where a section of the tumor 
had been implanted in her other breast in order to study its spread.13 Hahns 
international reputation appears to have elicited support from other doctors, 
and the reports do not seem to have harmed his professional standing.14 Sim-
ilarly, Robert Koch's standing seems to have survived the fiasco over the in-
troduction of tuberculin in 1890 and the ethical questions that were rapidly 
raised by other physicians about the basis for its use in human subjects.15 On 
the other hand, the Prussian government did forbid the use of tuberculin 
against a patients will in 1891.16 Lederer also cites a cancer-grafting experi-
ment in France, by Victor Cornil in 1891, which was denounced by the Aca-
demie de Medecine and barred from presentation. And she discusses a 
number of American and British experiments from the same period, which 
attracted hostile peer responses and inquiries by professional bodies.17 
A number of factors seem to have combined to generate this concern. 
One, obviously, was the changing nature of medicine itself. Medical experi-
mentation could not become an issue much before the 1850s simply because 
very little was being done before that time. But at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, doctors transformed hospitals from shelters for the old and 
feeble into sites where patients could be collected, categorized, and observed.18 
As this process gathered pace, it merged with the contemporaneous develop-
ments in biological sciences to recast patients as not just the objects of obser-
vation but of intervention and experimentation. Doctors struck a perilous 
bargain with the urban poor, who would receive access to whatever care or 
treatment counted as appropriate by the standards of the time in exchange for 
making their bodies available to education or research.19 
A second element was the creation of the modern medical profession. At 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, healing was an open market with 
more or less unfettered competition between those who we would now 
describe as "regular" and those who we would describe as "irregular" practi-
tioners. Again, genealogies have been constructed to link the winners from 
the licensing regimes introduced during the nineteenth century to medieval 
guilds or colleges, but these are essentially mythical. Modern medical profes-
sions emerged in Europe as the state became increasingly involved with the 
provision of health care, beginning with the French law of 19 Ventose 1803, 
which defined the qualifications of those who could provide free treatment to 
the poor as envisaged by the Revolutionary government.20 This process of 
unification and standardization proceeded at varying speeds in different 
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countries as state funding was made available. In the United Kingdom, the 
growth of salaried offices in local government and the Poor Law was associ-
ated with government action through the Medical Act 1858. In Germany, a 
period of deregulation in the 1860s was followed by reregulation at a state 
level, following the introduction of a national health insurance scheme in 
1883. The French licensing regime was reconstituted in 1892, alongside the 
consolidation of the public hospitals and associated with the introduction of 
a limited mutual insurance scheme under the Medical Assistance Law of 
i893-21 
The creation of these monopolies of legitimate practice reflected a coin-
cidence of state interest and occupational lobbying, where science was an 
important rhetorical device for those demanding professional regulation on 
terms favorable to themselves. Practice that rested on a scientific basis could 
be justified as an object of state investment more readily than the claims of 
folk healers, empirics, or cultists, all of whom were seen as serious rivals by 
nineteenth-century doctors.22 Biomedical experimentation became more 
than just a hobby for leading practitioners, or part of an intraprofessional 
competition for status and recognition. It supported physicians' public claim 
to superiority over potential rivals for healing work. As such, publication was 
crucial: although the first scientific journals appeared in the seventeenth cen-
tury, it is estimated that there were only about thirty in regular circulation by 
1800, increasing to around two thousand by 1900.23 
While the conduct of experiments on patients, and public announce-
ment of the results, may have been necessary conditions for the recognition 
of the treatment of participants as a social problem, they would not, in them-
selves, have been sufficient. We also need to ask what shift in values made this 
seem unacceptable. This is a complex question, but would seem to involve 
some reevaluation of the bargain between doctors and the poor that acknowl-
edged greater citizenship rights for the latter. Instead of giving their bodies in 
return for charity, the working class, if not the destitute, were increasingly 
pressing their own claims through both mutual aid and state institutions. 
Germany, Britain, and France pursued rather different routes in the political 
incorporation of the working class, but faced a similar challenge from roughly 
the 1870s onward. 
Germany seems to have been distinctive in approaching biomedical ex-
perimentation as a potential matter for state intervention. Arguably, this 
reflects the attempt to manage working-class grievances through social legis-
lation as an alternative to the recognition of socialist political parties—the 
Social Democratic Party was a banned organization between 1868 and 1890, 
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when the basis of the German welfare state was constructed, for example.24 In 
1892, the Wissenschaftliche Deputation fur das Medizinalwesen, an advisory 
board appointed by the Prussian Ministry of Culture, expressed its concerns 
over biomedical research in a report on the permissibility of human experi-
mentation.25 This began to address the question of the circumstances under 
which doctors could experiment on patients and sought to draw a distinction 
between entirely novel investigations in the name of science and investiga-
tions to explore the application of established knowledge. It recommended 
that dangerous experiments purely in the search for scientific knowledge 
should be forbidden, although they might be permissible where patients were 
terminally ill. This privilege should be restricted to scientifically trained doc-
tors, excluding naturopaths and other competitors. 
In practice, the report had a limited effect. Its distinctions were difficult 
to sustain: research did not clearly distinguish between therapeutic and basic 
goals and could always be reinterpreted in retrospect. Moreover, the Prussian 
legislators focused on the statute creating Medical Courts of Honor (Arztliche 
Ehrengerichte), which did not finally come into force until April 1, 1900.26 
Although these self-regulatory bodies are sometimes thought to have been 
concerned to police medical practice, Andreas-Holger Maehle shows that, 
as with the General Medical Council in Britain, most of their work actually 
concerned offenses against the professional community, breaches of collegial 
etiquette rather than mistreatment of patients. However, they did have a stat-
utory foundation, in contrast to the management of experimentation mainly 
by administrative directives. 
Nevertheless, by the early 1890s, Germany, or at least the state of Prussia, 
had identified the ethics of human experimentation as an issue forbiomedi-
cine in a way that had not occurred in either Britain or France. Richard 
D. French comments, "it is clear that through the mid-nineteenth century 
experimental medicine in Britain was greatly underdeveloped, both in tech-
nical sophistication and degree of professionalization, in comparison to 
developments in Germany and France."27 The British were not doing much 
work on humans, so their concerns had focused on animal experimentation, 
resulting in a regulatory framework under the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 
which lasted until replaced by the Scientific Procedures Act 1986.28 What 
might be perceived as the backwardness of British medicine meant a lack of 
research and thus few experiments: "in Britain, the situation in the first 
decade of the century was still the traditional one of part-time hospital con-
sultants pursuing mixed careers of teaching and practice, with clinical 
research being a luxury sandwiched in by those so inclined."29 As for France, 
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Giovanni Maio argues that the medical profession had successfully defined 
experimentation as an internal issue on which there was no relevant public or 
political interest: "The astonishment of the French observer [of Germany] 
relates primarily to the fact that the named regulations officially sanction the 
right to experiment and thus affirm the need to conduct non-therapeutical 
experiments."30 The French were amazed that the Germans thought regula-
tion necessary. Maio is referring here to the Anweisung an die Vorsteher der 
Kliniken, Polikliniken und sonstigen Krankenanstalten (Directive to all med-
ical directors of university hospitals, polyclinics, and other hospitals) issued 
by The Royal Prussian Minister of Religious, Educational and Medical Affairs 
in 1900, but his analysis focuses on the conditions that generated this, to 
which we turn in the next section. 
NEISSER'S EXPERIMENTS AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
IN GERMANY 
In 1892, Albert Neisser, a leading professor of dermatology and venereology, 
injected nine female patients, being treated for other diseases, with serum 
from syphilis patients. Even though some of the test patients were minors, no 
consent was obtained, and the injections were presented as routine treatment. 
Four patients, all prostitutes, later developed syphilis. While this established 
that the serum had no protective value, it was unclear whether they had con-
tracted the infection from the experimentation or from their trade. 
Neisser's study was first published as a scientific article, but was then 
picked up by a liberal newspaper, the Munchner Freie Presse as part of a series 
that it ran from October 1898 on 'Arme Leute in Krankenhausern' (poor 
people in hospitals).31 Although the coverage was skewed by the editor's anti-
vivisectionist agenda, it promoted a considerable scandal in the press and the 
Prussian Parliament, which, according to Barbara Elkeles, conflated genuine 
concern about the legality of the experiments with anti-Semitism. Although 
many of Neisser's peers could see nothing wrong with his behavior, a disci-
plinary proceeding was brought. The Royal Disciplinary Court for Civil Ser-
vants fined him 300 marks with costs of 1245 marks and administered an 
official reprimand in December 1900 for neglecting his duty, as a physician, 
clinic director and professor, to obtain consent from the test patients or their 
legal representatives.32 
Alongside the proceedings against Neisser, the Prussian Ministry for 
Religious, Educational and Medical Affairs commissioned a range of medical 
and legal opinions about experimentation in human subjects.33 Ludwig von 
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Bar, from G5ttingen, provided a particularly influential opinion, which 
emphasized the dominant view among academic lawyers that medical inter-
vention without consent was an assault contrary to the Penal Code. Consent 
could justify experimentation that involved minor risks but subjects must be 
fully informed about all likely hazards. Experimentation on juveniles was 
never justified, even with parental consent. On the same day that Neisser was 
disciplined, the Ministry issued the Directive to heads of clinics and hospi-
tals. This forbade any medical intervention that did not serve diagnostic, 
therapeutic or immunization purposes if (1) the person on whom it was car-
ried out was a juvenile or not fully competent; (2) the person concerned had 
not fully consented; (3) the person had not been informed in advance about 
potential harmful effects. The intervention had to be authorized by the clinic 
or hospital chief and the details recorded in the patients file.34 
Although the Neisser case was the most conspicuous, it was far from 
untypical of medical experimentation at the time. Albert Moll , a neurologist 
and psychiatrist specializing in sexual disorders, identified more than six 
hundred ethically questionable experiments in his Arzliche Ethik, published 
in 1902.35 (Some examples appear as Figure 1.) Mol l adopted a position close 
to that of the lawyers in arguing that the doctor/patient relationship should 
be seen as a voluntary contract that did not give the physician any special 
rights to introduce elements or impose treatments that had not been explic-
itly incorporated into the contract. The patients right to self-determination 
must be respected. Molls position attracted limited support from his peers, 
however, although it was well received and widely cited by lawyers. Unlike 
many of his other books, it did not go into a second edition and received 
rather cool reviews. The organized medical profession continued to lobby for 
exemptions from the general law of battery whenever the German Criminal 
Code was reviewed, right through to 1927, although without success.36 
The 1898-1900 German crisis over medical experimentation seems to 
have been generated by four factors, although their status as explanations 
must have an element of conjecture. More evidence is still needed on who did 
what when, but we can note some of the wider social and cultural shifts that 
are likely to have contributed to making it possible to articulate these chal-
lenges in these ways. One was the development, since German unification in 
1871, of a political mass press that reached large sections of the population 
and could mobilize support, in this case from social democrats, in the Prus-
sian Parliament.37 Neissers abuse of his patients could become a public scan-
dal in a way that would not previously have been possible. Second, it provided 
a basis for social democrat challenge to the increasingly authoritarian domestic 
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A doctor examined the sensitivity of female genitals on 18 female persons, who were 
either i l l or pregnant. The series of experiments was meant to establish the extent to 
which women are able to correctly locate an object inserted into the outer urogenital 
system and to make a judgment regarding the size, shape, texture/consistency etc. of 
the object. Tested in particular were the urethra, vagina and uterus. Especially dubious 
seems to me a case concerning a 25 year old virgo intacta, who was diagnosed with 
chlorose. I find that medical gynecological examinations on a young girl are very 
questionable; as are many others which are in no way related to a goal of healing. 
That these experiments were very embarrassing for the respective person can be 
deduced from the words of the author: "during these examinations it has to be taken 
into consideration that through the many questions and manipulations the patients 
became scared and distressed and occasionally refused to answer." 
More alarming appears the experiment conducted in a clinic where the patient 
was given antipyrin, after he recovered from the symptoms of his intoxication, and 
only to once again study the intoxication symptoms, and, most importantly, without 
explaining to him that he was now being used as a guinea pig. He was given the 
antipyrin in peppermint water. From this arose pain when swallowing, swelling of the 
lips, strong salivation, shivering, cyanosis and mild edema on hands and feet. His 
temperature rose to 40.9° and an exanthema appeared. Only after 14 days was 
everything in order so that the patient could be released as healed. 
A "pediatrician" examined whether or not it is possible to transmit roundworm 
infection. He raised a culture from the feces of a child in which roundworms could be 
found under the microscope, and then, for a quite long period of time, he performed 
such infection-experiments on a variety of children admitted to the hospital for 
entirely different illnesses. It was established whether these children already had 
roundworms. The feces-culture containing roundworms was administered to the 
children in syrup and the children were then given Santonin to flush out the worms. It 
is well known that Santonin is an extremely dangerous remedy. The experiments were 
a success, as the feeding of feces-cultures (!) indeed generated roundworms in the 
children. 
A northern researcher already examined the artificial immunity of protective-
vaccinations. His aim was to find out whether the ingestion of protective substances 
led to a later vaccination without any reactions (side effects). For this purpose orphans 
were injected with sterilized lymph. Afterwards said children, fourteen of them, were 
vaccinated day after day. What make these much cited experiments noteworthy are 
the words of the author: "maybe I should have experimented on animals first. 
However, the calves suitable for this experiment were unobtainable due to their cost, 
which is why I began to conduct my experiments on children of the orphanage Y , 
with the gracious permission of primary doctor X , and thought to maybe conduct 
experiments with animals on the side." 
Fig. l . Examples of Experiments Questioned by Mol l 
regime of Wilhelm II and the post-Bismarck chancellors. The parliamentary 
strength of the SDP continued to grow throughout this period, following its 
relegalization in 1890. The treatment of workers by the sickness insurance 
scheme and the balance of interests between doctors and workers was a tense 
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issue. The behavior of elite physicians was a synecdoche for the wider 
exclusion of the working class from the governance of institutions crucial to 
their well-being, although this was in part a reflection of their own status in-
securities relative to the military and aristocracy.38 
Third, there were tensions within the profession itself, which had become 
more competitive: in Prussia, the ratio of doctors to population rose from 
1:3,112 in 1876 to 1:2,114 in 1898.39 This may well have been an element in the 
increasing evidence of anti-Semitism within the profession, particularly as 
Jewish researchers clustered in fields like bacteriology and venereology, 
where a substantial amount of human experimentation took place.40 Although 
science might be important to the professions external legitimation, its inter-
nal ownership was always a potential source of rivalry that could erupt into 
wider view. Fourth, the evidence suggests a growing competition between 
medicine and law for control of the medical sphere. Law was central to the 
development of the German state in the nineteenth century and the consoli-
dation of bourgeois interests.41 As a result, German lawyers were historically 
more prestigious and deeply entrenched in the societal elite than were 
doctors. Much of the medical regulation through the Courts of Honor was 
modeled on that developed by the legal profession.42 However, the lawyers 
were clearly concerned about the attempts by doctors to place themselves 
beyond ordinary legal jurisdiction, whether as a matter of self-interest or of 
principle. 
This conjunction provided for concerns to leak into the public domain 
and to be pursued in ways that pressed the Prussian government to act 
through the 1900 directive. However, while this is often held up as an exem-
plary and prescient regulation, its practical impact is questionable. Writing in 
1902, Mol l questioned its coherence: the scope of exemptions was ill-defined; 
entries in a patient record did not guarantee full and unambiguous consent, 
particularly given the low educational level of many hospital patients; and, 
most egregiously, responsibility for enforcement had been placed in the 
hands of some of the leading sinners, the prestigious professors and clinic 
chiefs who exercised the power of minor deities over their subordinates.43 
Elkeles notes that the commission set up to monitor compliance with the di-
rective through reviews of the published scientific literature ceased to func-
tion in 1913, having only considered six cases, all of which were considered to 
have been harmless.44 
Nor did the directive have much impact beyond Prussia. Other German 
states seem not to have adopted it, though six of these had established Courts 
of Honor between 1864 and 1876, before the Prussian system was introduced. 
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One should also note the lack of apparent impact on U.S. medical research 
institutions, which were strongly influenced by German models at this time. 
While more research is needed on the impact of the Prussian model, it is still 
necessary to focus on the specifically Prussian contingencies that generated 
the 1900 directive rather than assuming this to be representative of German 
developments as a whole. 
CONTROLLING EXPERIMENTATION: THE SECOND ATTEMPT 
Even within Prussia, attention to medical research ethics died away quickly 
after 1900. No further high-profile scandals were reported, and the issue did 
not reappear on the policy agenda again until after World War I.45 By the 
1920s, however, a substantial level of public concern had reappeared with a 
wide consensus that this attempt at regulation had failed. The medical profes-
sion itself had never taken ownership of the directive, preferring to ignore 
voices like Moll's. The nationalist climate of Wilhelmine Germany had estab-
lished an environment where the behavior of professional elites was largely 
unquestioned and unquestionable. Esther Fischer-Homberger argues that 
World War I led to "a new doctoral morality, which placed the welfare of the 
endangered Fatherland above the well-being of the individual sick person."46 
The fall of this regime with Germany's defeat in 1918 reopened the issues, 
although the debate was not an immediate political priority as the Weimar 
Republic tried to deal with the problems of economic and political 
reconstruction. 
Discussion regarding the ethics of human experimentation became more 
widespread after World War I: 'In the 1920s in Germany, criticism in the daily 
press, as also in the Reichstag, of alleged unethical conduct on the part of the 
medical profession reached a crescendo unparalleled in any other country"47 
The vigor of the renewed discussion is also illustrated by the founding of a 
new journal called Ethik in 1922. Frewer describes it as "the first journal, 
which contained the term 'ethics' in the title of a medical journal and focused 
on the discussion of ethical questions in medicine."48 There was also more 
direct political pressure from people like Dr. Julius Moses, who practiced 
general medicine in Berlin and was a prominent Social Democrat member of 
the Reichstag: "In 1930 Moses alerted the public to the deaths of 75 children 
caused by pediatricians in Lubeck in the course of experiments with tubercu-
losis vaccinations."49 More widely, there was concern about the relationships 
between hospitals and the German pharmaceutical industry. Although this 
had lost some of the international lead that it had held before World War I, 
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because of the expropriation of its patents, particularly in the U K and the 
United States, it remained at the forefront of product development. The price, 
however, was widespread testing of new therapies on German patients.50 
A representative of the Reichsgesundheitamt (National Health Administra-
tion), speaking early in 1930, summarized the accusations: 
Naked cynicism; placing the lives of small children on the same level 
as those of experimental animals (rats); dubious experiments having 
no scientific purpose; science sailing under false colours; crimes 
against the health of defenceless children; lack of sensibility; mental 
and physical torture; martyrization of children in hospitals; the 
worst forms of charlatanism; disgustingly shameful abominations in 
the name of science run mad; horrors of the darkest middle ages, 
outstripping the infamous deeds of the Inquisition and the hangman; 
social injustice; discrimination between the rich and the poor.51 
The change in national priorities due to the war had contributed to a men-
tality among the medical profession that placed scientific progress and the 
welfare of the society as a whole above that of the individual. The view that 
disabled, elderly, and "incurable patients" were nothing more than parasites 
draining the strength of the Fatherland became more widespread during the 
1920s.52 The renewed debate led the Reich Health Council to hold a session on 
March 14, 1930, to discuss the circumstances under which medical experi-
ments on healthy and sick subjects might be permitted.53 
The two main speakers were Friedrich Miiller from Munich and Alfons 
Stauder from Nuremberg. Both supported the principle of human experi-
mentation, although admitting deficiencies in practice. Miiller argued that 
experiments should only be undertaken with the patients agreement unless 
the patient was confused or unconscious. They should be carefully planned, 
evaluated, and executed by suitably experienced staff, with the chief physician 
assuming ultimate responsibility. He rejected a proposal from the Berliner 
Arztekammer, which had found support in the press, that there should be an 
official regulatory body for human experimentation. This would cause se-
rious conflicts, stifle research, and hinder German medical science in inter-
national competition. Stauder was given the brief of explaining the current 
ethical stance of the medical profession. He stressed the physicians duty to 
try to alleviate or cure a patients condition by any available means, which 
might lead to experimentation. Indeed, any intervention was in some sense 
an experiment, but without this kind of risk-taking, medical progress would 
cease. In the end, he concluded, the limits to experimentation would not 
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be set by law or by regulatory intervention but by the doctors professional 
conscience.54 
Subsequently on February 28,1931, the Ministry of the Interior published 
a Circular, Richtlinien fur neuartige Heilbehandlung und fur die Vornahme 
wissenschaftlicher Versuche am Menschen (Guidelines on innovative therapy 
and scientific experimentation involving human subjects).55 The precise legal 
status of this document remains disputed.56 Professor H.-J. Wagner and 
others claim that the guidelines remained in force until 1945, although they 
were not part of the prewar legislation that was validated at the end of the 
war.57 However, although Howard-Jones had adopted this position in 1978, in 
a 1983 paper he simply refers to them as recommendations without legal 
force.58 A review of the original text suggests that they may be better under-
stood as a contractual device rather than as an actual regulation: all doctors 
working in institutions under the jurisdiction of the Reichsgesundheitsrat 
(National Health Council) were required to sign a commitment to the guide-
lines when taking up their employment. Enforcement would presumably 
then be through employment discipline rather than professional discipline or 
a regulatory agency. Nothing is said in the document about its applicability in 
these terms to existing employees, although presumably they would be 
expected to abide by its provisions. Given the institutional continuity that 
persisted throughout the Nazi period, it would certainly be correct to regard 
the document as continuing to have some kind of force, at least in the sense 
that it does not seem explicitly to have been withdrawn. On the other hand, 
since it was not a regulation as such, one would not expect it to be directly 
incorporated into the postwar legal code. 
The 1931 guidelines are set out as fourteen points. They begin by recog-
nizing the need for medicine to progress by introducing novel therapies and 
that human experimentation makes an indispensable contribution toward 
achieving this goal. However, the rights granted to doctors to experiment 
must be balanced by an awareness of the special duties that are associated 
with the protection of the life and health of each individual involved. The 
likely risks must always be proportionate to the benefits. New therapies may 
only be introduced after testing in animals, if possible. Patients must always 
give explicit and documented consent, based on appropriate information, 
unless the need is urgent for the preservation of life or the prevention of 
severe damage to health and prior consent cannot be obtained. In the latter 
case, the record should explain why consent could not be obtained. New ther-
apies should be introduced with particular care on patients under the age of 
eighteen and without exploitation of social or economic need. Particular care 
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should be taken in all cases when the therapy uses living microorganisms. The 
use of novel therapies must always be the responsibility of the chief physician. 
Al l of these principles applied equally to experimentation. In addition, how-
ever, the guidelines banned any experiment that did not make a clear contri-
bution to therapeutic development. Animal studies must always precede 
human experiments. Experimentation could only be carried out on minors if 
the risks were minimal and must never be carried out on dying patients. The 
guidelines should be consistently stressed during academic teaching.59 
On paper, the guidelines were impressive. They went well beyond con-
temporary provisions elsewhere: there seems to be "no parallel for such con-
cern, or for such governmental action, in any other country."60 Moreover, 
many commentators consider that in most respects they were in advance of 
subsequent codes, such as the Nuremberg Code of 1948 and the Helsinki 
Declaration of 1964.61 Hans-Martin Sass notes that "the Reichsrichtlinien 
apply the principles of the Hippocratic Oath to the modern world of human 
experimentation in clinical therapeutic and nontherapeutic research. They 
(a) emphasize the leading physicians personal responsibility for the subject 
involved and the professions general responsibility for progress in the healing 
arts and sciences, (b) establish some special guidelines in special areas of 
human experimentation, and (c) stress strongly the teaching of research ethics 
and ethics of new therapy on all levels of medical education."62 According to 
Howard-Jones, the only aspect in which they were lacking pertained to "ref-
erence to independent ethical review"63 And even this idea was in circulation; 
Moll had previously called for a structured forum for discussion, a call, as 
noted above, echoed by the Berliner Arztekammer and the general press.64 
However, these calls were rejected by the relevant state agencies, who pre-
ferred to emphasize the need for doctors to behave ethically. 
The real problem was that Germany in 1931 was not fertile ground for 
ethics regulation. In certain respects, these regulations reflected the aspira-
tions of the expanded welfare state of the 1920s, with the government attempt-
ing to implement the social rights embedded in the constitution. However, 
these guarantees were now under increasing attack as morally and financially 
unsustainable. A n increasing influential body of German political opinion 
was arguing that the sick, the weak, and the feeble-minded should be consid-
ered lower-priority candidates for social protection. This view had gained 
increasing traction within the professions, the universities, and the civil ser-
vice, who had all suffered badly from the political and economic turmoil of 
the early 1920s, and faced a renewed assault on their values and interests in the 
face of the economic crisis of the early 1930s. They were all deeply conservative 
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institutions, concerned to sustain a traditional bourgeois class structure in 
the face of demands that they adapt to the democratic conditions of the 
republic. The understanding of law, for example, was dominated in both the 
courts and the universities by a positivist approach that emphasized imper-
sonal formalism over the class-oriented substantive justice demanded by leg-
islators. Contraction in the labor market had created a significant pool of 
unemployed graduates and public employees had experienced repeated wage 
cuts. Although there were pro-republic elements among all these groups, they 
were marginal voices with limited impact except through their influence on 
some legislators. For most of these professionals, the natural order of things 
would only be restored once the poor and the working class were reestab-
lished in their proper place, as grateful recipients of charity rather than citi-
zens with rights 65 
For the most part, then, German doctors' views on the ethics on human 
experimentation remained closely linked to their traditional view of the 
"doctor-patient" relationship. A doctors responsibility toward his patient 
remained the main moral yardstick from the first debates in the 1890s through 
to the 1930s. Significantly, the 1931 guidelines appeared only as an administra-
tive action rather than as legislation, which may not have been achievable in 
the context of economic chaos and political conflict. The values espoused by 
the authors of the circular had a precarious anchorage in the professional 
circles they sought to influence. 
As Elkeles stresses, "The roots of Medizin ohne Menschlichkeit (medicine 
without humanity) ran much deeper historically than the rise of National 
Socialism, that they were, in Viktor von Weinzacker's words, 'fostered by a 
way of thinking which viewed humans as chemical molecules or frogs or lab 
rats.'"66 This view was, she suggested, reinforced and legitimized by the ad-
ministrative approach to research governance: "The adherence to particular 
research-rituals turn into a magic formula, motivating, exonerating, vindi-
cating, and makes further explanations subordinate. The best example is once 
again found in bacteriology: Whoever relies in his research on the method 
established by Robert Koch does not require any further justifications of his 
procedure and his goals. ... Concurrently, the 'research student' places him-
self in the shadow of the great master'; into an affirmative and legitimizing 
continuity"67 Such views only intensified in the 1930s. Even the journal Ethik 
shifted to promote "biologism" and "collective ethics."68 Rather than champi-
oning the rights of patients, the journal's contributors came to argue an eth-
ical case for sterilization or euthanasia in the national interest of promoting 
the biological fitness of German citizens. 
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Without support in the culture of the profession, both the 1900 directive 
and the 1931 guidelines failed to change doctors' behavior. Julius Moses 
understood this, warning in 1932 that "in the national socialist 'Third Reich,' 
the doctor would have the following mission, in order to create a 'new, noble 
humanity': Only those that can be (fully) healed will be! The incurable sick, 
however, are 'dead weight existences,' 'human refuse,' 'unworthy of living' and 
'unproductive.' They have to be destroyed and eliminated. In other words, the 
doctor should become the executioner."69 Ten years later, Moses died in the 
concentration camp at Theresienstadt. 
REGULATION AND RESEARCH ETHICS 
Historians are always properly cautious about the notion that there may be 
simple lessons to learn from history. If events are seen as largely contingent, 
then generalizations are always fragile. Sociologists are a little more sanguine: 
while they may be more skeptical than they once were about the possibility of 
grand narratives, they are more comfortable with the notion that a series of 
cases can be examined to induce second-order generalizations from their 
similarities and differences, and that these generalizations may yield testable 
predictions about the outcome of other cases. What, then, can we infer from 
these experiences that may speak to contemporary policy debates. 
Perhaps the first point to be made is that, although we talk rather glibly 
of "ethical regulation," the German interventions seem to constitute regula-
tion in only the most minimal sense. Neither the 1900 nor the 1931 docu-
ments could be said to be "hard law" in the form of a statutory instrument. 
Both are, at best, "soft law," administrative actions based on the general com-
petence of civil servants that may have indirect legal consequences such as 
dismissal from public employment or complaints to professional disciplinary 
tribunals but which do not carry direct civil or criminal penalties.70 The 
existence of such interventions may still mark Germany as unique in the 
years prior to World War II, but their power and reach should not be 
exaggerated. 
The second point is to acknowledge that the evidence base for this article 
is quite thin and much primary work still needs to be done on the specifics of 
these cases. Although there is a growing literature in German and in English, 
the connections between the economic, cultural, professional, and ideolog-
ical factors identified by scholars and the production of the 1900 and 1931 
documents have not yet been clearly identified. This means that there is an 
undoubted risk that secondary authors cherry-pick their explanations and 
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conclusions because of the limited understanding of who was doing what 
when with what interests and/or motives. 
Some commentators, for example, may draw from these events the con-
clusion that administrative action alone is insufneient: the evident lack of 
impact in the German case could substantiate an argument that research gov-
ernance needs a statutory foundation and an enforcement agency. However, 
while the U.S. IRB system does have a legal basis in the rule-making powers 
of federal agencies, the equally interventionist U K system rests on adminis-
trative directions.71 Alternatively, one could draw the inference that the lack 
of impact reflected a failure to engage the hearts and minds of the physicians 
involved in biomedical experimentation. As Sass notes, writing about the 
contemporary situation, "By and large, problems of professional ethics have 
become problems of public policy. Questioning such a development does not 
automatically mean to question the general interest and right of the public to 
regulate ethical conduct ... but it does question the prudence of balancing 
public responsibility and personal responsibility and of replacing primary 
personal responsibility and liability with lengthy regulatory procedures and 
forms of shared or limited liability."72 
The danger that regulatory interventions may elevate procedure and ad-
herence to prescribed rules above normative evaluation is not, though, a 
recent concern, but one that has been raised by ethically sensitive doctors, 
like Albert Moll , in Germany since the late nineteenth century. Our "pro-
gress" in improving ethical standards may be due less to more interventions 
than to a change in perception by the medical profession and the subsequent 
move away from the "dominance over the sick person, the precedence of sci-
ence over well-being of the individual, the parochial mindset of the medical 
profession and the suppression of other ways of healing."73 According to 
Elkeles, this is the reason why the interventions in Germany from the 1890s 
to the 1930s did not lead to real change in the practices of doctors. 
It is important to be realistic about what regulation can achieve. While 
we maybe tempted to conclude from this account that ethical issues would be 
better addressed by hard law, command and control, interventions, there is 
abundant evidence that regulators make very restricted use of such powers, 
partly because of their own resource limitations and partly because of their 
desire to retain their own legitimacy among the regulated groups.74 In the 
case of medical experimentation, for example, regulators depend heavily on 
information from the scientific community both to define and to identify 
misconduct. Clinical work is not as accessible as production-line work to 
standardized rule-making or inspection.75 If regulation is considered to be 
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unduly prescriptive or penalties to be excessively harsh, those best placed to 
observe infractions are unlikely to cooperate by reporting them: those who 
are sanctioned will then often appear to be a random selection of socially 
marginal members, further increasing the perceptions of an arbitrary and 
unjust regulatory regime. 
Moreover, where the relational distance between regulator and regulated 
is small, as a result of similar educational and professional backgrounds, reg-
ular contact and shared sense of purpose—all of which are evident in the 
German context—enforcement is particularly likely to be restrained.76 John 
Braithwaite has argued that shaming for breaches of social norms is likely to 
be more effective than formal sanctions, but this depends on a context in 
which such norms are available as a point of reference.77 In this case, the 
wider conflict over the nature of the German state, and the place of different 
classes within it, left no common point of moral reference for medical ethics: 
indeed, to the extent that one existed within the profession and its main social 
partners throughout this period, it was more likely to have rested on the pri-
ority of national over individual interest than to have reflected the prefer-
ences of modern bioethicists. 
Regulation is a more complex matter than many bioethicists recognize: 
to the extent that it succeeds, it rests on a prior consensus of relevant opinion, 
although it may also articulate and mold that consensus.78 The presence or 
absence of regulation should not be equated with the presence or absence of 
barbarism in the treatment of patients or research subjects. 
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